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COMMENTS

issory notes or bonds. If this should be done the amounts of the promissory notes or bonds might be treated as amounts invested in the capital stock of the corporation 3 .
Therefore, in closely held corporations, we should not ordinarily
use preferred stock, and -we should not use an excessive amount of
promissory notes or bonds.
I See Swoby Corp. v. Oommissoner, 9 TC No. 118 (1947); 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 TC 1158 (1945), aff'd, 160 Fed. 2d 885 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947);
and John Kelley v. Commissioner and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner,
326 U. S. 521 (1946).

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTION

IN

FLORIDA-QUO WARRANTO
Among the extraordinary common law writs by which the courts
have been enabled to review action of the administrative branch of the
government is the writ of quo warranto. In many jurisdictions, this
writ is the complement of mandamus, being used to prevent administrative action which is arbitrary or in excess of power; in others the
writ is narrow in scope, being used only to test title to office or right
to franchise. Florida appears to be of the latter class. Since prohibition
lies only to prevent judicial or quasi-judicial action, recourse must be
had to equity where it is necessary to prevent arbitrary ministerial action in excess of powers unless title to office can be challenged.
In previous issues, it has been pointed out that administrative law
has been developed in the procedure by which courts review, correct,
or prevent action of the executive branch of government.
Quo warranto is an ancient common law writ. Statutory elaborations and modifications since the reign of Edward I have altered the
remedy, yet the basic purpose has remained the same. Blackstone defines
quo warranto as "a high prerogative writ in the nature of a wr of
right for the king against him who obtained or usurped any office,
francise, or liberty of the Crown, which also lay in case of non-user
or long neglect of a franchise, or mis-user or abuse of it."' The writ
later became an information in the nature of quo warranto which was
criminal in nature designed not only to oust the usurper, but to punish
him by fine for such usurpation. The sands of time have since shifted
and effectively obliterated this viewpoint, and an early Florida opinion
is found which sets forth the modern concept. "The proceeding by information in the nature of quo warranto is essentially a civil proceeding, and the pleadings in it are as much subject to amendment as they
are in ordinary civil actions. It is criminal only in form." 2
1 Blackstone 3 Com. 262, 4th Am. Ed. 322.
2 State v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1869).
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Actually the writ has always been the property of the public. Thus,
quo warranto'cannot be sought to determine a private right in which
the public is not interested. So any information in the nature.of a quo
warranto, like the writ of3 mandamus, never lies to enforce the performance of private contracts.
Although the Florida Supreme Court has said that quo warranto
is a writ of right which sovereign power demands through the medium
of its chief law officer, and requires respondent to show cause why
he or it should not be shorn of certain powers,4 later decisions by this
same court have declared the writ to be a discretionary writ and remedy. 5 The fact that the state was seeking the writ did not, in the former
case, make a discretionary writ one of right.
The State of Florida has, in addition to the aforementioned common law writ of quo warranto, statutory proceeding authoiized by
Secs. 80.01 to 80.04 1941 F. S. A. Both the Circuit Courts and the
Supreme Court have the power to issue writs of quo warranto according to Art. 5, Sees. 5 and 11 of the Florida constitution. Proceedings
by quo warranto, like those by certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus, and
prohibition, are orginal in their nature, though they may be invoked
to perform functions that are appellate in character. 6 This statutory
remedy is available to a person claiming title to an office, which is
exercised by another, upon refusal by the attorney general to institute
proceedings in the name of the state. The claimant is thus able to file
an information or institute an action against the person exercising the
office, setting up his own claim. Under the terms of the statute, the
court is authorized and required to determine the right of the claimant
to the office if he so desires.
3 State ex rel Moodie v. Bryan1 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929 (1905). Trustees of Florida Agricultural College made a contract with one W. H.
Gleason to locate college permanently In a certain place. Legislature
laterreplaced the trustees and the new ones were authorized to relocate
the plant. Court said that quo warranto was not the proper instrument
for enforcing private contracts.
4 State ex ret Landis v. S. H. Krew d Co., 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823
(1934). Suit to oust foreign corporation from its permit to do business in
Florida alleging that corporation by combination with associated cor-

porattons has "created and carried out restrictions on the full and free
pursuit of businesses authorized by the laws of the State of Florida".
5 City of Winter Haven i). State ex rel Landis 125 Fla. 392, 170 So.
100 (1936). Suit by attorney general to cut the size of Winter Haven
from four and one-half square miles to one square mile because of
irregularity of organization twelve years before. Held for the city, writ
is one for sound judicial discretion; it is the duty of the court to conRider all the conditions and consequences. State ex rel Hawthnrne v.
Wisehart 28 So, 2d 589 (Fla. 1946).
6 State ex rel Associated Utilfties Corporation v. chillnqoworth 132
FIn. 587, 181 So. 346 (1938).
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The gist of the common law action differs from the proceedings
brought under the aforementioned statutes. 7 Of the former, an opinion
has been delivered which stated that it is not necessary that there be a
relator or one contesting, as the gravamen is whether the respondent
is properly occupying the office and riot whether someone else is entitled
to it.' The court then proceeded to say that respondent's answer must
set forth with particularity all facts necessary to show good title.9 This
places the burden on the respondent to show that he is the rightful
occupant of the office in question. 10
As has been enunciated above, the two types of proceedings gain
the same result albeit the procedure has changed via the legislatures.
Under the statutes the burden is on the petitioner, and he can succeed
only on the strength of his claim and not on the weakness of that of
the respondent."
The line of demarcation between quo warranto and mandanmus
has at times eluded strict definition. In dealing with this difficulty
the Florida Supreme Court has said that when an office is filled by
an incumbent who is*exercising the functions of such office de facto
and under color of right, mandamus will not lie to compel the admission of another claimant. In all such cases the party aggrieved, who
seeks adjudication upon his alleged title and right to possession, will
be left to assert his right by the aid of an information ii the nature
of a quo warranto, which is the only efficacious and specific remedy
to determine the questions in dispute. 12

In attempting to define the scope of the writ under consideration
in the sense of determining when and under what circumstances quo
warrinto proceedings are proper, it is essential to examine the decisions
which have issued in this jurisdiction. One case has delimited the scope
7 Sees. 80.01 to 80.04, 1941 F. S. A.
8 State u. Gleawn, supra. Note 2.
Suit to oust W. H. Gleason from office of Lieutenant Governor on
grounds that he was .unqualified at time of his election in that he was
not at the time a citizen of Florida for three years.
9 State v. Gleason, supra. Note 2.
I0 State v. Saxon, 25 Fla. 342, 5 So. 801 (1889). Respondent charged
with usurping the office of Clerk of the Circuit Court demurred and
was overruled. Court said that non usurpavit not a proper plea; that
full and complete requisites must be shown to have been complied with.
II State ex rel Clark v. Klin.qenwmith, 126 Fla. 124, 170 So. 616 (1936).
Relator claimed that he was entitled to office held by respondent anti
alleged that nineteen illegal ballots were counted for respondent and
three legally cast for relator not counted.
12 City of Sanford v. State, 73 Fla. 69, 75 So. 619 (1917). Defendantin-error brought mandamus against the mayor and city council of the
City of Sanford alleging that he was lawful treasurer and assessor
of said city and that the mayor had unlawfully appointed another tot
xaid office. Held thitt manlamu. was improper.
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by stating that quo warranto will not lie except to test the right of
a person to hold an office or franchise or exercise sonic right or privilege
the peculiar powers of which are derived from the state.t 3 Such office
must be of a public nature to justify employment of quo warranto to
14
try title to same.
Mere function of office, as distinguished from- the office itself,
may not be the subject of quo warranto." Such proceedings against
the officer do not constitute a proper remedy to test the legality of his
past or future conduct, where it does not ipso facto operate as, or form
grounds for, forfeiture of office; and neither title to office nor right
to franchise is involved.' 6
Corporations, being creatures of the state, are not infrequently
involved in quo warranto proceedings. Ordinarily, information in the
nature of a quo warranto may be used to determine the right to exercise of corporate office or franchise.' 7 Such has been held to be proper
to resolve the validity of an election of corporate officers."8 Thus, it
appears that the instrumentality of quo warranto is at the beck and
call of a properly interested victim of corporate inequity of this type.
Its existence serves to stay violations of rights and powers arising from
public franchise.
The concept that quo warranto is chiefly concerned with maintaining, as its underlying premise, the interest of the public may act
to deny issuance of the writ. Where such relief will result in confu13 State ex rel Merrill v. Gerow, 79 Fla. 804, 85 So. 144 (1920). Relator
brought action to oust respondent from the office of Chairman of the
Republican State Executive Committe of Florida. The writ was denied.
1+ State ex rei City of St. Petersburg v. Noel, 114 Fla. 175, 154 So.
214 (1934). City challenged right of respondent to occupy the office of
Chief of Police of the city. Respondent questioned the authority of the
court to issue the writ. Application was granted.
15 State ex rel Landis v. Vaz, 117 Fla. 311, 157 So. 651 (1934). Quo
warranto to prevent city commissioners from issuing a permit to build
a dog-racing plant in restricted district under provision of zoning ordinance giving commissioners power to vary provisions of zoning ordinance in specific cases to prevent hardship held not to lie where issuance
of the permit was only speculative.
if. State ex rel Landiv v. Valz, vupra. Note 15.
17 Gentry-Futch Cormpany n. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 106 So. 473 (1925).
Injunction sought in equity to oust respondent from exercising office
of president of a corporation. Held that quo warranto was proper unless jurisdiction of the cause was in equity on other grounds and determination of title to office incidental. Equity has no inherent Jurisdiction where mere right to office is involved.
IS Datidson v. State, 20 Fla. 784 (1884). Respondent contended that
position of president of Stevedore's Benevolent Association not such an
office or franchise as can be inquired into by information in the nature
of a quo warranto. Held against this contention.
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sion and disorder and will produce injury to the public which outweighs individual right of complainant to have relief, quo warranto
will not be granted even though it clearly appears that complainant
may be ordinarily entitled to relief. 19
The public interest requires that one properly entitled should discharge the duties of a public office. In pursuance of this policy, a public officer with imperfections in his title should be ousted. Time, however, can heal and make perfect his title by removal of his disqualifications. Thus mollified, public interest wanes and an adjudication of the
rights of the litigants inter se would serve no useful purpose. A recent
case well illustrates this principle. There is was said that quo warranto would not be granted to challenge the office of a judge of the
Circuit Court because the judge had been appointed in violation of the
constitutional provision that no legislator shall during his term be
appointed or elected to any civil office that has been created or the
emoluments thereto increased during his term as member of the
Legislature 20 which had increased Circuit Judges' salaries, where judge's
term as legislator had expired at time when quo warranto proceed2
ings were brought. '
The writ of quo warranto along with other extraordinary legal
remedies occupies an important position in our governmental scheme
by its remedial effect on errors of the executive and legislative
departments; it is another of the many checks and balances. Although
the writ had its origin in antiquity, it has a quality of flexibility which
lends itself to progress. As has been said herein the writ is discretionary, thereby enabling the courts to fit the remedy to the social and
economic conditions extant where circumstances compel a step forward.
19 State ex rel Pooser v. Wester, 126 Fla. 49, 170 So. 736 (1936).
Pooser et al filed an information In the nature of a quo warranto seeking to invalidate a primary election but waited until less than a month
before the November election. Held that confusion and disorder would
result in injury to the public which outweighed the individual right of
the individual.
2n Art. fII, Sec. 5, Fla. Conat.
21 Ktotr ex rrl ffawvthopte r,.W,;ehopt. spra.
Note S,

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN
FLORIDA-MANDAMUS
In a previous issue of this publication,1 a discussion was begun of
the extraordinary common law writs and their use in Florida as a
means of asserting judicial control over administrative processes. There
i See "'Certiorari to Administrative Tribunals in Florida" Vol. 2
Miami Law Quarterly 181.

